

Party Organizer



"The Election Campaign must be conducted by the entire mass of Party members, not by the leaders alone; it is necessary to make use of and be in complete touch with all the manifestations of the masses (strikes, demonstrations, movements among the soldiers and sailors, etc.) going on at the moment; it is necessary to summon all the masses of the proletarian organizations to active work."

The Communist Party and
Parliamentarism: Thesis of
the Second Congress of the
Communist International.

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No. 10

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Make the Betrayal of the Workers Impossible

By EARL BROWDER

A WONDERFUL army, the army of the striking textile workers in the North and South, was betrayed by its generals. The strike was called off, the strikers sent back into the mills without having won even a single one of the strike demands. "The greatest victory of the workers"—that is what the Gormans and Greens call this betrayal. But the calling off of the strike must be called the greatest betrayal of the workers, carried out by the Gormans and Greens.

A wave of hatred and anger against this sort of labor leaders is rising in the breast not only of every Communist, but every other honest worker, every honest trade-unionist. It is with this kind of tactics that the German trade union leaders helped Hitler to power, it is with this kind of tactics that the reformist trade union leaders in all countries disorganized and demoralized the workers. With this kind of leaders one helps the company union campaigns of the employers. With this sort of leaders, misery, demoralization, fascism are inevitable. With this sort of leaders there can be only defeats and no victories.

These scoundrels dare to accuse the Communists of organizing strikes irresponsibly for the sake of striking. When we Communists propose a strike we do it in order to win the necessary demands.

But what do this kind of leaders do? The textile workers were striking for three weeks. They were starving. They fought against armed forces. Fifteen were killed, hundreds wounded, but the morale of the strikers was not broken. Even the Gormans themselves had to admit this before the strike was called off. But now they call off the strike without the demands having been won.

Yes, an unheard-of betrayal. But here one question arises which every worker, and especially every Communist must ask himself. That the Gormans and Greens would try everything to betray the strike is nothing new for the class-conscious worker. But this is not all. The

other question must also be asked. How was it possible that the Gormans were able to betray the strike?

And to this question there is only one answer, and every Communist must candidly give himself this answer:

Communists Were Not Strong Enough to Prevent Betrayal

Because the Communists were not yet strong enough among the textile workers to prevent this betrayal. Because we have not yet brought into the Party hundreds and thousands of the most active textile workers. Because we have much too few organized Communist nuclei in the twelve hundred textile mills. Because the **Daily Worker** is not yet the daily paper of tens of thousands of textile workers. Because we Communists were not yet the driving and organizing force of the unified action of the textile workers against the bureaucrats in every local of the U.T.W. Because we Communists have not yet seen to it that in every local of the U.T.W., honest rank-and-file leaders are put in the lead. Because we Communists have not yet to a sufficient degree popularized the policy of the Party in order to make harmless the insidious Red scare.

Because we have not yet taught the workers to a sufficient degree to conduct the strike over the heads of the leaders, not only to begin the strike but also independently of, and over the heads of the leaders to continue the strike with their own strike committees. Because we Communists have not yet to a sufficient degree exposed to the workers the whole demagoguery of Roosevelt and of the arbitration boards.

Yes, the betrayers betrayed. That is their business. But the task of the revolutionaries is to prevent the betrayal, to make it impossible.

It is true, we Communists were everywhere active in the front lines of the struggle, on the picket lines. We fought well in the ranks of striking textile workers. In every phase of the struggle we showed the workers the next step, what they have to do in the interest of the strike, what they have to watch out for. Wherever we had forces we organized in general.

But that is just the question—"where we had forces". In hundreds of towns, in hundreds of mills, in hundreds of U.T.W. locals we have not yet any, or only very weak forces. That is the crux of the matter. As an organizing force, we Communists were still much too weak among the hundreds of thousands of textile workers in the thousands of mills, to prevent this betrayal.

Let nobody make an excuse of the difficulties of the task, the terror, etc. To overcome just this, and to overcome it quickly, that means to be a revolutionary, a Communist.

The Tasks of the Communists

What are the conclusions to be drawn from this strike?

The struggle showed that there is a tremendous power in the American working class, and showed at the same time that this tremendous power can be disorganized by treacherous labor leaders. It shows at the same time the still tremendous weakness, namely the absence of sufficiently strongly organized Communists among the textile workers. But without this factor, there can be no victory despite the heroism of the striking workers.

Our tasks are therefore clear. We must not, as we did so often in the past, leave the field. We must increase our work among the textile workers tenfold, we must now utilize all connections which were built up during the strike in order to strengthen the Party, the press, the organized groups and the U.T.W. locals.

We must carry on tremendous political and organizational work among the textile workers, individually, in smaller and larger mass meetings. In every nucleus, in every local, in every unit, in every section and district in the textile territory, the whole work of the Party must at once be checked up on, in order to find out who fought well, who was a failure, in order to improve our work at once in order to increase the rate of growth of our influence among the textile workers. The **Daily Worker** must be built into a mass paper among the textile workers.

To make impossible the betrayal of the betrayers—that means better work—that is the conclusion that we Communists must draw from the hatred against the betrayal which is surging through tens of thousands of workers.

New Tasks In the Election Campaign

By R. GRECHT

TREMENDOUS mass struggles of the deepest significance to the entire labor movement have been taking place in the United States in the recent period. The San Francisco general strike brought American labor to a new high level of action as a **class**. Now we are in the midst of the greatest labor battles in American history—the general textile strike.

In all these struggles, the developing power of the mass resistance of the workers to the New Deal hunger program has been answered by the capitalist class with increasing violence. This is particularly evident in the textile strike. The complete mobilization of the National Guard in the South and New England, the murder of strikers and the threat of the use of Federal troops, martial law in Georgia and the threat of martial law in Rhode Island, the establishment of a concentration camp, Hitler style, in Georgia, for arrested pickets, clearly reveal the strike-breaking role of the capitalist government and the advance of fascist methods of terror.

There is already evident a widespread breaking down of New Deal and N.R.A. illusions as a result of the experiences of the masses not alone in these strike struggles, but also in the worsening situation among the unemployed and threats of curtailment of relief, in the desperate conditions of the poor and middle farmers under the A.A.A. However, it is the task of the Communists to give this disillusionment conscious direction into channels of revolutionary political action.

The present situation demands of us a most intensive campaign to unmask bourgeois democracy and the capitalist State; the broadest utilization of the election campaign to expose the two major capitalist parties and politicians, as well as the Socialist Party, Farmer-Labor Party, Progressive Party in Wisconsin, and to bring the Communist election program before the broadest sections of the toiling population.

Examination of the Campaign In the Districts

An examination of the election campaign in various districts shows that the campaign is lagging seriously, and is still widely underestimated. In most of the districts the first stage of the election campaign—placing our candidates on the ballot—has been completed, and to a certain extent

an election campaign apparatus established. But the second stage of developing a mass election campaign, in a manner which shows the leadership of our Party in the struggles of the masses, has not yet been definitely undertaken. The approach to the election campaign is as yet too formal. It is considered too frequently simply as another campaign of mass meetings and leaflets, while the necessity of the most intimate linking up of the election campaign with every struggle of the workers, every action led by our Party, has not yet permeated our ranks.

For the remaining period before November, every district committee, every section committee and unit, should review the status of the election campaign, and find the ways to carry out the directives of the Central Committee.

Not a single action shall be undertaken by our Party, in connection with the textile strike, unemployed struggles, anti-fascist movement, farm relief, etc., in which the election program of the Party shall not be brought forward. To every step taken by the government—nationally, or on a state and local basis—to support the textile or other capitalist interests, to safeguard capitalist profits, to intensify fascist methods of terror against the workers, we must react quickly with a sharp exposure of the role of the capitalist State, bringing forward in answer the program of our Party.

Communist candidates must be in the forefront of the actions and struggles of the masses. They must be popularized among the toilers. They should strive to establish personal contact with workers in their election districts, through participation in the local, shop and neighborhood struggles, through group meetings of workers, house to house canvassing with our literature and press. The sectarian approach to the utilization of candidates, basing itself on an abstract, impersonal approach to the masses in the elections, must be speedily overcome. The masses will grasp our program more readily when they hear it through our candidates and see it in their activities. At the same time, this will help to expose the bourgeois and social-fascist demagogues who try to divert the resentment and sharp discontent of the masses into safe channels of supporting social-fascist and "progressive" capitalist candidates.

We must at once extend our campaign to reach new strata of workers, new organizations, with special attention to the American Federation of Labor, to Negro organizations. We must utilize those forms and methods which are suited to the actual state of class consciousness and preparedness of these organizations, emphasizing the sections of our pro-

gram which most meet the needs and interests of these elements.

It is essential to involve the mass organizations supporting our program and candidates in independent activities. All too frequently, these organizations merely participate in the actions of the Party, without themselves undertaking to reach new masses on the basis of their own contacts, their particular role and program, through their own leaflets, meetings, symposiums and debates as on the Negro question, Unemployment Insurance Bill, Farm Relief Bill, etc. This applies, among others, to trade union and unemployed organizations, farm organizations, language and fraternal bodies, cultural clubs. Not is it sufficient to obtain the endorsement of leading committees of these organizations. We must strive to reach and activate the membership down below, so that they, in their shops, neighborhood, labor and fraternal organizations, may act as individual agitators and organizers for the Communist election program and candidates. This cannot be accomplished without an effective mobilization of our fractions in the mass organizations.

Planned Activities In Last Weeks of Campaign

We must emphasize strongly that during the remaining weeks of the campaign, every district and section should develop systematic and planned election activities in the factories of concentration, bringing our program to these workers, connected up with their shop conditions, through leaflets, shop papers, shop gate meetings, group meetings of workers from the shop, etc. At the same time, we should follow out a concentration policy in the election districts where our influence is strongest and we have the best opportunities to win the masses for our program and candidates; which means a concentration of forces, speakers, leaflets, election programs, literature, **Daily Worker** and other language press, house to house canvassing, etc. It is particularly necessary to penetrate the neighborhoods where the Negro masses live. A campaign of **mass agitation and propaganda** should be developed, without which it will be impossible to rally mass support in the elections.

While intensifying our activities in these various aspects of the election campaign, we must at all times bring forward clearly before the masses our revolutionary goal. The struggle for the workers' immediate needs, represented in basic demands in our election platform, should be bound up in all of our agitation and propaganda with an explanation of the Communist position on the workers' way out of the crisis, and for a Soviet America. The statements and editorials on this question in the **Daily Worker** should be

used as a guide, and popularized among the masses. In this way we will more effectively expose the social-fascists and demagogues of all shades, counteract the "Red scare," and win the masses for our Party. In this way we will be able to carry through one of our principal tasks in the election campaign — to build and strengthen our Party through recruiting the militant fighters from the ranks of the toiling masses.

Youth and the Elections

By J. MARKS

THE problem of winning the toiling youth of America for the support of the Communist election program was never as important as it is in the present campaign. On the part of the youth there is the greatest participation in the present wave of strikes. The number of youth on strike during 1933 and this year far exceeds that of the post-war period, first because in the last decade youth have been drawn into industry on a large scale and in spite of lay-offs the proportion of youth in industry is higher than in the post-war period; second, the present strike wave involves many industries in which there are large numbers of youth which in the past were either completely unorganized or not affected by strike struggles (auto, textile, etc.). In these strikes the youth stand out for their militancy. In the textile strike the youth form a large core of flying squadrons—many youth are among the killed or wounded. In the present wave of strikes the youth who have been newly involved in the class struggle are learning for the first time the role of the State. Many of the deeper illusions about democracy are being shattered for the first time. It is the duty of our Party and League in the present election campaign to approach especially the youth, many of them first voters, and turn their bitterness against Government strikebreaking into conscious political understanding. The election campaign is the means for increasing the political awakening of the youth and winning them as supporters of the Communist program.

Necessary to Combat Fascist Appeal to Youth

The capitalist parties have an understanding of the feelings prevalent among the youth. That is why they have launched campaigns to recruit the youth for Young Republican and Young Democratic Clubs, which at present

number hundreds of thousands of youth. The Republican Party has set itself the goal of recruiting 4,000,000 youth for its Youth Clubs. The Republican Party utilizes the widespread unemployment among the youth and the failure of the New Deal Government to provide youth relief, the growing disillusionment with the New Deal, to gain the support of the youth for its program. They resort to fascist flattery of the youth to win them. They point out that the present difficulties of capitalism are attributed to old leaders and their policies and that youth is the key to saving the system and for instituting changes in policy.

The best barometer of how easily the youth can be won for the Communist program and to what extent they have advanced in political understanding was witnessed at the First American Youth Congress which was held in New York in July. At this Congress, which was sponsored by a fascist group, connected with the Federal Government, the mass of delegates coming from religious, sports, pacifist and the most varied type of youth groups, rejected the proposals of the committee sponsoring the Congress and rallied behind the program of the Y.C.L. and the Left group in the Congress. Most of these youth had no previous contact with the Y.C.L. Few knew of its exact program. But this cross section of American youth, workers, students, etc., in the discussion at the Congress, saw the correctness and logic of the Communist program. Their own experiences taught them that the way out as proposed by the Y.C.L. answered their needs. The success won at the Youth Congress can be duplicated in every city in America where our program can be brought to the youth. It can result in a large increase in Communist votes that will come from the youth. More than that a proper campaign among the youth will be the best means for converting widespread radicalization among the youth along conscious revolutionary channels and will be a stimulus for building the Y.C.L. and doubling its membership by January 1, the task that was decided upon at the Seventh Convention (July 1934).

Special Youth Demands Must Be Popularized

An effective campaign among the youth demands in the first place a wide popularization of the special Y.C.L. national demands as well as local youth demands. This will not be done effectively if it will become the tasks of youth candidates or the Y.C.L. alone. The special function of the Y.C.L. in the campaign is to be the best helper of the Party, to win the youth to the Communist program. It can do this if every election leaflet of the Party, if every mass meeting of the Party, if every Party candidate

makes a special appeal to the youth based on the election program of the Y.C.L. and on the local needs of the youth. It is especially important for the whole Party to explain to the youth the revolutionary aims of the Party and what a Soviet America will provide for the youth.

The special demands of the Y.C.L. are:

1. For replacement of the C.C.C. and Transient Camps with unemployment insurance and jobs at trade union rates for all youth, Negro and white. Against the discrimination of youth in relief.

2. Equal pay for equal work for young and old, Negro and white. Against the discrimination of youth in the industrial codes.

3. For the right of all over 18 years to vote, including soldiers, sailors, C.C.C. youth. Old enough to work, old enough to vote.

4. Vocational training for all youth between 14 and 18 years of age, under workers' control and at full wages. Government support at no less than \$3 per week for all children under 14 now working.

5. Immediate Federal appropriations for opening all closed schools and for building new school buildings, playgrounds and recreation centers, especially in Negro territories.

6. Against all form of capitalist militarism. For the immediate abolition of the National Guard.

The above program with few changes was adopted by the American Youth Congress.

In the present election campaign the Y.C.L. is undertaking, not only to force the granting of suffrage to youth over 18, but on Election Day, through young voters' committees, and youth election committees, special election booths will be established in as many cities as possible. There the youth between 18 and 21 will be supplied ballots and will vote on their choice of programs and candidates. The results of their vote will be made public and will be sent to Government authorities. This is aimed at stimulating political activity among this disfranchised section of youth and to create in them the determination to fight for the right to vote. In addition special parades and picket lines in front of polling places will be organized to demand the right to vote.

(Other features and problems of the youth and the elections will be elaborated in the **Daily** and in other publications. These must be studied by Party as well as League comrades).

Election Campaign and Unemployment Insurance

By M. RAPORT

OUR Party is entering the election campaign of 1934 under conditions much different from those in 1932. Objectively the broad masses are disillusioned more than ever before, with the fake promises of the politicians. Roosevelt's promise in 1932 that "no one shall be permitted to starve" and all the other promises of the New Deal, are becoming clearer to the toiling masses as promises for hunger, war, and fascism, but the disillusionment of the masses and their readiness to struggle depend on how quickly our Party can react and mobilize the workers against the forces of reaction.

Lessons From Past Campaigns

In entering the election campaign of 1934, it is necessary to draw some lessons from the previous campaigns in which we have participated (1932). The central demand of our Party in 1932 was Unemployment Insurance, around which we were supposed to rally the unemployed and employed workers in a united front to struggle for more relief, against forced labor, shorter hours, etc. It meant that every Communist was to penetrate every unemployed organization, build fractions, and concretely expose the fake leadership who were using the misery of the masses for their own ends.

However, our Party in District 12 did not understand the united front policy, and failed to realize that a united front is an integral part of all our activities, that it must serve as a connecting link between our Party and the workers. While formally accepting the line, the actions were to the contrary. The District leadership failed to realize that 25,000 workers (Seattle) organized their own organizations (the U.C.L.) for the purpose of improving their conditions, and were being betrayed by the leadership led by the Musteites, and we failed to recognize that it was the duty of our Party to form a united front with the rank and file, based on correct leadership, to oust the fakers. The District Committee issued the famous slogan "Smash the U.C.L." which separated our Party from the workers to the extent that while the U.C.L. headed by the Musteites and other politicians was flourishing, we had a small Unemployment Council with a few Party members, isolated from the workers. At the same time the fakers utilized all our mistakes to strengthen themselves among the masses, using

the organization as a vehicle in the election campaign by electing Dore, Stevenson, Zioncheck, and a host of other politicians to the state legislature. But the fakers knew that a mass organization of unemployed would constitute a grave danger to them, and they decided to break it, particularly when our Party learned from the mistakes, and organized a real united front Hunger March, and succeeded in capturing the County-City Building for three days.

And in this historic event our Party, while abandoning the "Left" sectarian slogan "Smash the U.C.L.," pursued a Right-wing line, hiding the face of the Party, told the workers to go home peacefully, failed to raise Unemployment Insurance as a basic demand, and even collaborated with the police, and the commissioners. The District Bureau did not meet to guide the workers. Failing to recruit into the Party, all this helped to break the morale of the workers and to weaken the organization, which played into the hands of the Musteites.

Consequently, the Party faced the task of fighting against Right and "Left" sectarian methods as speedily as possible in order to save the organization and become a leader of the masses.

Unemployment Insurance the Central Demand

Unemployment Insurance has become the fighting demand around which the Party began to come out of its sectarian rut, began to lead struggles, organized forced labor strikes, stopped evictions (temporarily), won increase of relief, and finally culminated in a real united front Labor Congress (September 1933) with 319 delegates present around the central demand of Unemployment Insurance.

The correct application of a united front policy to Unemployment Insurance (although with many mistakes and shortcomings) helped to weld the unity of the employed and unemployed. We saw in the Maritime Strike, that the U.C.L. became one of the leaders in the strike, mobilizing their membership to clean the scabs off the waterfront, participating in the picket lines, obtaining relief for the strikers, taking initiative in calling a general strike, also teaching the longshoremen and seamen how to defeat the fakers in the I.L.A. and the I.S.U., based on their own experiences. In many cases the misleaders of the I.L.A., and the I.S.U. were forced to retreat.

During the recent fascist attack, led by the government against the militant strikers and our Party, we found that our Party was able to function best precisely where we had our roots amongst the masses. Wherever we had no contact with the masses we suffered the most.

In the fall election of 1934 a greater barrage of demagoguery is being peddled, from Roosevelt down. All politicians in the state of Washington are promising Unemployment Insurance to the workers (in 1932 they promised to build Socialism within the shell of capitalism), Old Age Pensions, and Social Security. At the same time they are feeding the workers tear gas and machine guns, smashing strikes, depriving the workers of their elementary rights more than ever before.

In the light of this experience our Party decided to place The Worker's Unemployment Insurance Bill before the state legislature which convenes January 15, 1935. It requires the collection of 50,000 signatures by January 6, 1935. Thus we shall force the state legislature to act on it at once, and if they say no, the Bill must go on the ballots in the next general election.

Collection of Signatures MUST Be Accompanied by Other Activities

The collection of signatures gives our Party a wedge to come to hundreds of thousands of people who are looking for a way out. However, we must be careful not to supplant the collection of signatures with other activities. On the contrary the collection of signatures must become a rallying point in the election campaign, to struggle for more relief, against forced labor, concretely to expose the N.R.A., and must be used as a means of building our Party and press. Every action taken, such as demonstrations, street meetings, visiting homes, strikes, other activities, must center around Unemployment Insurance.

Already some disrupters and many politicians are raising the question "what's the use, you tried it last fall, and you only collected 30,000 signatures. Why not support us, and you will get Unemployment Insurance." We must remind them of the promises that they made in 1932, and that after they were elected, workers were clubbed and jailed for raising their demands.

The failure to get the 50,000 signatures last fall was due to the opportunist leadership which still had some foothold in the U.C.L. (Dobbins) which carried on a double book-keeping, which deliberately failed to carry through the plans of our Party, which stifled the initiative of the locals, and supported capitalist politicians in the last city election. We have learned that in order to become leaders of the masses, our units must meet regularly, our unit bureaus must function, our fractions, which are the connecting link between our Party and the mass organizations, must meet regularly and plan the work.

Therefore, the collection of signatures must reach the broadest masses, and it is clear that during the election campaign every rally organized by all candidates must be canvassed for the collection of signatures. We must call for mass endorsements at every meeting, demanding from the politicians, their position on the Worker's Bill. Unemployment Insurance Clubs must be organized in the neighborhoods. Every local of the A. F. of L. must be visited, a broad collection of signatures must be made in the shops and in the mills, the busiest corners in the city must be covered, demonstrations held in the city councils and before the county commissioners, forcing them to endorse our Bill. All this must lead to preparation for the mass mobilization of workers for collection of signatures at the polls on November 6. County Hunger Marches are to be prepared for the week of November 10 to 17. We must begin to make preparations immediately for the state Hunger March for January 15, when the state legislature meets, to be there to support our demands.

All these activities give our Party an opportunity to bring into our ranks hundreds of workers who are ready to join our Party. In every step that we are going to take in this campaign, the Party must be brought forward as the leader. Our answer to Roosevelt's program of hunger, war, and fascism, must be a united front of all workers under the leadership of our Party.

The Election Campaign in the Countryside

By J. B.

THE Communist Party platform of immediate demands for the election campaign is a basis for building up broad united front support. We can get influential people, groups, and organizations to support the immediate program, who might not agree at all with the ultimate aims of the Communist Party. It is possible and in various cases desirable to have non-Party candidates run on the Party ticket, providing, of course, that they are good fighters and accept the program of the Party ticket. Concerning the support of organizations over which we have control, in many cases it is better to have them endorse candidates and the immediate platform rather than endorse the Communist Party as such. In other cases where official endorsement would tend to cause a split or narrow down our mass organization it would be better not to try to force through

an official endorsement in the organization but to get as much support among the individual members as possible. The Communist demands have wide sympathy and we can rally broad masses around them.

Daily Needs of Farmers In Communist Platform

A distinguishing characteristic of the immediate demands of the Communist Party platform is that they contain the vital every-day demands of the poor farmers, which, if we are going to win, require a real struggle of the exploited farmers, an alliance with and under the leadership of the workers. In other words our fight is a revolutionary, a class fight, on these every-day issues. No other party stands for such a fight—a fight under the leadership of the powerful working class.

The socialist leaders and the Farmer-Labor leaders are afraid of real unity between the workers and poor farmers and of working class leadership with its vanguard, the Communist Party. They want lawyers, businessmen, big farmers, labor bureaucrats for their leaders.

Distinction Between Communist and Reformist Demands

We know that any real benefit for either the poor farmers or the workers must come at the expense of the interests which rob and exploit them both. This means a real fight, a real mass struggle on as broad a united basis as possible.

Here is the big distinction between the revolutionary class demands and the reformist demands. The reformist demands try to get something without costing the bankers or landlords anything,—some reform, some New Deal, some tariff, some inflation, etc., which the bankers will be willing to give without a struggle on the part of the toilers. They try to make the farmers think there is an easy, painless, struggleless way out. But these reforms cost something and this something is taken out of the hides of the poor farmers and workers. While the reformists say nice words and raise illusions the farmers' pockets are robbed, and perhaps a little bit handed back to make them keep quiet. (The processing taxes, for example). The farmers themselves have many illusions too, which the reformists cater to, but which we must expose. The Communist Party, on the other hand, always puts forward demands which make the exploiters pay, and to make them pay means a mass fight. No other party keeps to such a principle.

Our election campaign is one way of mobilizing our mass strength to win these vital needs of the exploited farmers. Here we find one of the most effective answers

to the idea "If you vote for the Communist ticket you are just throwing your vote away, Communist candidates won't be elected." We must answer the farmers, first, if you vote for some other Party you vote against the exploited farmers and workers because all other parties are against them. Also, the Communist candidates have been elected in a number of places, and are going to be elected in greater numbers. But most important of all, even if the candidates are not elected, the greater number we get to support these demands, the more we are able to win. This is our principle of mass struggle. Just as in a demonstration, strike or other struggle, every extra person we are able to rally in support makes us stronger, helps us better to win.

The Way Out For the Farmers

While the Communist Party goes into the election to fight for and help to win the immediate demands we also want the exploited farmers and workers to learn that the Communist Party is the only political party which will lead them in the correct way not only for their daily needs but also toward a lasting solution of their problems through the establishment of a revolutionary workers' and farmers' government. The election campaign gives us an excellent opportunity to do this in a very practical way. If we do not bring forward the Party, as they failed to do in South Dakota for instance, the farmers do not learn that only the C.P. can lead them every day and for the final solution. On the other hand the farmers may even begin to feel that the Communist Party leadership is not necessary, because they do not see it. The revolutionary way out of the crisis is a fundamental distinction between the C.P. and all other reformist parties, Socialist Party, and openly capitalist parties.

The election campaign should bring many new members into the Party because they see that it is really the only party with a real solution, both now and finally.

In explaining the advantages of the Revolutionary Workers and Farmers Government, Soviet Power, we can very effectively popularize the advance of agriculture and industry in the Soviet Union and the rising standards of living. An especially effective comparison can be made between the way in which the Soviet workers and farmers met the drought danger and the New Deal's welcome of the drought destruction here.

In showing the difference between the Communist Party and all other parties, it is important to explain that the Communist Party stands for and fights for the poor and

middle exploited farmers and never for the large farmers. All other parties without exception, especially the Farmer-Labor Party, cater to the large farmer and capitalist elements. Any such party that pretends to represent the interests of the big farmers and at the same time the interests of the poor farmers, is trying to fool the poor farmers, because the interests of the two groups are opposed to each other. Reformist parties talk about "all" farmers, try to make the farmers believe that there is no difference between the rich and the poor farmer, but at the same time they work in the interests of the big farmer. The big farmer lives by exploiting others, while the poor farmer lives by his own labor. The Communist Party works for a direct alliance of the workers with the poorest and small farmers. Middle farmers also, while they may fairly frequently hire labor, are much more exploited than they are exploiters of other people's labor. They have their major interests in common with the small farmers and workers. Therefore the Communists try to draw them into the alliance of the poorest and small farmers with the workers. The election campaign should be a very important factor in showing to these exploited farmers that their interests are inseparably bound up with the workers.

In the campaign we must pay special attention particularly in the West, where the farmers are so politically active, to drawing agricultural workers into prominence and leadership and into the Party. We have not paid enough attention to the agricultural workers and every effort should be made to being among them and to carrying on consistent work among them. We will find it of special importance to make extra efforts to break into the small towns and villages where rural workers live, in order to win them to support us. The agricultural workers serve to form a link between the city workers and the farmers, they become strategically very important.

The Communist Campaign and the Drought

In this election the Drought Relief Campaign is the central issue among the farmers. The drought also affects all of the toiling population—a splendid united front issue. At the same time it is tied up with the campaign against the A.A.A., the New Deal, with the campaign for the passage of the Farmers Emergency Relief Bill, and the whole fight for relief and better conditions for the farmers.

We should also show the similarity between the Roosevelt and the Hoover-Republican program. Special effort and attention must be given to expose the demagoguery and fine words of these leaders, since many farmers still believe

and are affected by them—compare their words with their deeds! We should also become very familiar with the activity of the Farmer-Laborite leaders, etc., so that we can expose them concretely as well as by their paper programs.

In the Campaign special plans must be worked out to distribute and get new subscriptions for the **Daily Worker** and for the **Farmers National Weekly**. These are excellent means of carrying on an educational and organizational campaign on a wide scale, and of maintaining contacts after the election is over. Besides the national leaflets on the election platform and on the farmers' situation, many leaflets should be printed and distributed.

In this connection it is well for the Party members to become more familiar with basic Party documents which will be of great help in understanding how the Communists approach the farmers' movement. The **Second Congress Thesis on the Agrarian Question**, should be read, **The Communist Position On the Farmers Movement**, **Lenin's Infantile Sickness**, and **What is to be Done** will give a start.

In carrying on the election campaign in the country it is necessary for us to give attention to all of the demands of the national election platform, the anti-war and the anti-fascist points and the building up of these campaigns are of tremendous importance in the rural sections.

Building a Mass Unit in a Concentration Mine

By **BILL WILSON**

THIS article deals with the Party unit at the X—— mine in Bessemer, Alabama, the largest iron ore mine on Red Mountain, property of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railway Co., and one of the three concentration points in District 17.

During the great ore strike on Red Mountain during May-June of this year the Communist Party units in the ore mines, which were very young and inexperienced, made the grave mistake of stopping to meet because of picketing, daily union meetings, police terror, etc. At the time the strike began we had about 30 Party members on record in the X—— Mine. Toward the end of the strike we made strong efforts to get contact with the comrades in the camps and were finally successful in getting three comrades out to a meeting. This marked the beginning of the organization of one of the strongest Party units in the District.

With the few contacts we had gained it was impossible, under conditions of illegal work, to prevent the sell-out of the strike although we succeeded in raising enough opposition to postpone the acceptance of the agreement for a day.

Working with the three comrades we had contacted, we succeeded in drawing back a few more of the Party members for meetings. With these comrades we discussed the new problems at the mine, the tasks of the Party unit and methods of organization. The main grievances of the miners were that the scabs continued on the job, getting preference over the union men, the building of the company union by the scabs, the muckers (who form the large majority of the miners) got \$3.45 a day instead of the agreed upon \$3.60, and no pay for dead work or overtime. And 12 days after the company resumed operation the T.C.I. shut down this mine, in order to smash the bona fide union and to weed out the militant union men. At the beginning the major activity of the unit was distributing leaflets which gave the miners guidance on how to better their conditions.

Problems of Organization

The problem of organization was difficult. We started the group system with groups of five to seven miners in a group with a group captain. The group captains were to form the unit bureau and plan the work for the whole unit. In order to have this function properly we picked the most militant, advanced and aggressive Party members that we had contacted to form the bureau. By the middle of July we had the unit bureau meeting regularly and planning work.

The main problem, the organization of the groups around the group captains, was much slower. When we were able to go into the camps we held large meetings of Party members, instructing them on the tasks of the Party unit in the mine and on the functioning of the group system. These large meetings were very enthusiastic and gave us a real estimate of our strength, once we had it organized in functioning groups. Almost six weeks now we have worked to make the group system function and can already record certain progress. A few of the groups actually function, others not so well, but all the comrades are willing to carry on work. More instruction and educational work will determine how well they will function.

The unit bureau, which has been fairly stable and is becoming more stable each week, is forming plans of work for the whole unit which include the following:

Recruiting for the Party. Since the first week in July the comrades have recruited from two to four members each week and have built the unit up to a membership of about 50. Some of these new members have turned out to be very aggressive and are taking on the most important work in the unit. Recruiting continues each week in planned recruiting meetings. There is a plan for getting white miners into the Party and already we are preparing a recruiting meeting for several of the most militant white miners. This will be one of our largest steps forward, and a most decisive one.

Building rank-and-file groups. The plan here is to organize on certain issues the support of the rank and file miners around the Party groups to support our proposals. We can record some successes already (pushing one of our comrades into office and winning over another on the Board) although we have not been able to utilize anywhere near our real strength. We have managed to push through the endorsement for a United Front demonstration for relief in the last week or two.

Building the Y.C.L. Here the bureau decided to organize the Y.C.L. around each Party group, set up the Y.C.L. unit on the group system and form a unit bureau, having a Party member attend the Y.C.L. group meetings and the bureau meetings, and having a Y.C.L. comrade on the Party unit bureau. So far we have one of the most militant young workers on the Party unit bureau who is in charge of organizing the Y.C.L. and this week we held our first recruiting meeting where we got five Y.C.L. members. Now that we have a foothold the organization of the young workers will go much faster.

Daily Worker, **Southern Worker** and other literature. Starting from scratch we have built up the circulation of the **Daily Worker** to 50 of the Saturday edition and a regular bundle of five. Payment for these gets better as the unit becomes more consolidated, so that the last report included payment for almost all of our bill. The **Southern Worker** sent 100 copies to this unit and for the last issue everyone has been paid for. Other literature that came to the unit has not been paid for and perhaps will not, but new shipments will be paid for because the unit is more consolidated. Considering that the Party members were on strike for eight weeks and then after 12 days work were laid off again, our success here was not so bad.

Dues payments. This important gauge of our work has not been nearly good enough. We have had some dues payments but they have been sporadic. Now we are having another membership check-up, as a means of more firmly

establishing the group system and getting the comrades to pay dues regularly. This has been stressed a great deal and it should not be long before the dues payments are regular.

The Life of the Unit

The study group. The unit bureau started to study Comrade Browder's Report to the Eighth Convention. During the last few weeks we have not continued this study but we are taking it up again at the next bureau meeting. The comrades are anxious to study and learn so the study group will continue as a regular part of the bureau meeting as we had originally planned.

The most successful work the unit has done was to have their union local endorse a call for an unemployed demonstration which was issued by a rank and file committee. Although the leaders are trying to sabotage this demonstration, every indication at the present time is that we will succeed in getting the unions to take part in the demonstration.

The Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill has been presented to the union and although the leaders are trying to stop it by saying the National Convention endorsed it and that was enough, the mass support for the Bill will undoubtedly force it through over the heads of the leaders.

The unit issues leaflets regularly on every issue that confronts the workers in the mine and in the union. Through the leaflets we have gained a great deal of influence and in the coming weeks we will have our baptism of fire which will be the real test of our strength in the X—— Mine. Already we are fighting a vicious Red scare in the union and at present we seem to be coming out victorious. The T.C.I. bosses are quoted as saying, "We don't give a damn about the union, it's that God-Damned Communist Party we want to get rid of."

A Study of Fluctuation In the Chicago District

(Excerpt from Report of J. Peter to Central Committee)

THE Central Committee, at its July session, after discussing the unsatisfactory situation regarding the growth of the Party and the question of fluctuation, decided to examine the lower organizations in several districts in order to ascertain the reasons for the high fluctuation and unsatisfactory recruiting.

This decision was carried out immediately and in July

three concentration districts were visited. Although only five days were spent in each district, a thorough investigation was made of at least two units and one section in each district, from which certain facts were learned and certain conclusions drawn.

In the investigation, the Commission concentrated on the work of the street nuclei, where the fluctuation is one of the most outstanding problems. One or two shop nuclei were also examined, and it was discovered that in the shop nuclei there is practically no fluctuation. In fact, there has been a definite improvement in recruiting through the shop nuclei. There are also many street units in the districts which function very well, participate in and lead the struggles of the workers in their territories, do real mass work, recruit new members, build mass organizations, spread the **Daily Worker** and grow steadily, entirely eliminating fluctuation.

The examination of the units and sections was based on the following points: (1) Mass activity of the units as an independent Party organization; (2) utilization of the **Daily Worker**, literature, leaflets, shop papers, neighborhood papers, meetings, etc.; (3) initiative of the unit; (4) leadership in the unit; (5) inner-Party education, discussion; (6) dues-paying apparatus; (7) method of recruiting; (8) composition of membership; (9) guidance from higher committees.

In order to ascertain the actual fluctuation in the units examined, a comparison was made of the membership in each unit today with that of six months ago. In this article we will deal only with a portion of the examination conducted in the Chicago District, which with slight variations is the picture presented by all three districts.

Territorial Unit Loses Seven Members

In Section 7, which covers a territory of Negro and white population, the commission examined a territorial unit, which six months ago had 20 members: five social workers, seven housewives, one storekeeper, one peddler, one janitor, three office workers, one shoe worker and one hotel worker. Of these eight were employed, either in offices or on relief jobs. Seventeen were native born. There were three Negro women—housewives, and 17 white members in the unit. This was the picture six months ago. Today the unit has 15 members; **seven dropped out of the Party.**

Why did these seven members drop out of this unit? The three Negro housewives had been in the Party almost a year, and had been very active. They were in the forefront of every struggle. They have all dropped out, but, what is most interesting, have remained in the I.L.D., where

they are very active. We tried to find out why all of the Negro comrades dropped out of this unit. The comrades tried to explain it on the basis that they got tired; that they had no money to pay dues, etc., etc. Only after a more thorough discussion were we able to learn the real reason. We found that at the unit meetings, the white social workers and office workers occupied the floor all of the time, pushed the Negro comrades in the background, and that there were definite white chauvinist tendencies in the unit. This point came out only after cross-examining the unit bureau. This unit recruited two members during the six months—one lawyer and one social worker. Two other members were recruited through the general activities of the district and assigned to this unit. There is no organized discussion at the unit meetings; discussions are not prepared. The agenda of the unit is based on the Section Org. Letter and checking on the activities of the mass organizations (the unit has an I.L.D. branch and Unemployment Council in its territory with a membership of approximately 100). **The Resolution of the Eighth Convention had not been discussed**, and only 100 Manifestos of the Convention had been distributed. **Eighteen Daily Workers** are sold daily by two comrades of the unit. The other comrades are not involved in soliciting for the **Daily Worker**. In six months, no leaflets of any kind were issued by the unit, and with the exception of one protest meeting against police brutality, no meetings were organized.

No Political Life In Concentration Unit

The next unit which we examined was a unit concentrating on a railroad yard employing 400 workers. Six months ago this unit had 14 members. In this period no new members were recruited, but four of the original 14 dropped out. With transfers in and out, the unit today has 13 members, of whom three are native born. All members are paid up in dues to date, and nine or ten attend meetings regularly. The unit bureau does not meet. In the six months period there was only one discussion—on the Election Campaign. No leaflets were issued; no meetings were held in the name of the Party unit. No **Daily Workers** were sold in the unit territory. **Of the 13 members, only one reads the Daily Worker regularly.** Six buy the **Party Organizer**. Literature is not sold by the unit, and only 100 copies of the **Manifesto of the Convention** were distributed. An agenda of one of the meetings was as follows: (1) Election of Chairman; (2) Roll call, checking on dues, etc.; (3) Railroad Work—one comrade assigned to help distribute the **Daily Worker** at the yard on Mondays; (4) Activity of the Unemployment Council, which has 120 members, with

five Party members in it leading the organization; (5) Raising money for the Section; (6) Signature Drive for the Election Campaign; (7) Demonstration Against Discrimination; (8) Activity of the I.L.D. (which has a membership of 10, with 4 Party members).

A Good Example

The Commission examined another unit, in Section 4, Chicago, which can be held up as an example of how a unit should function. This unit is concentrating on a machine shop employing approximately 500 workers. Six months ago there were only seven members, six of whom were foreign-born. The social composition of the unit was 100 per cent proletarian. During the last six months, the unit recruited 7 members, and expelled one disruptive element who was suspected of being a spy. Not one member dropped out of the Party during this period. Today the unit has 14 members (one gained through transfer). During this period it has built up a shop nucleus inside the concentration factory. The street unit has two brigades for concentration—one which brings the Party's face to the factory, sells **Daily Workers**, distributes Party leaflets and shop papers before the factory gate; the other a union brigade, which agitates the workers to join the Metal Workers' Industrial Union, distributes union literature, union papers, etc. The leadership of this unit is young. The organizer has been in the Party 9 months; the agitprop director 8 months; but these comrades understand how a Party unit should function. The unit bureau, which meets regularly and works out concretely the agenda for the coming unit meeting, discusses ways and means of developing the work among the masses in the territory and in the concentration point. Every second week the unit has a street-corner meeting in the name of the Party unit. The basic weakness of the unit consists in the fact that only two members live in the unit territory, but despite this, splendid work is done among the population of the territory. Every member of the unit buys five pamphlets of every new edition and sells them to other workers. The unit sells 60 **Daily Workers** and 100 copies of the Saturday issue. Because of the many young workers in the unit territory, the unit bureau decided to organize a soccer team. Two comrades were assigned to organize it and in two weeks the organization was built, creating great enthusiasm among the young workers. In this sport group, the assigned comrades lead regular discussions on political questions. Four comrades, who are assigned to unemployed work, work as a brigade and report regularly to the bureau on their activity, and the unit bureau, after a discussion, brings the main problems before the unit

meeting. Of the 14 members, 13 read **The Communist**; 10 the **Party Organizer**. The unit has a discussion at every meeting, prepared a week in advance by the bureau, and material is given out to every member to read on the subject a week in advance, resulting in very interesting discussions on current problems. There is real enthusiasm among the Party members for the work. Every member of the unit is paid up in dues, and from 11 to 13 members attend meetings regularly. Those who are not present have legitimate reasons for absenting themselves.

Conclusions From Examination

What general conclusions can be drawn from the examination, as to the cause of the unsatisfactory growth of the Party and the tremendous fluctuation?

1. The most outstanding shortcoming, from which many others flow, is the weak leadership in the lower organizations. The Party has not yet carried out the task set by the Open Letter of shifting the center of gravity of Party work to the development of the lower organizations, the factory nuclei, section organizations and street nuclei. There is still too much reliance on written directives from the higher bodies, and insufficient daily guidance to the lower organizations. If the situation is to be changed, the Party Committees must take immediate steps to develop the forces in the units and sections, by patiently helping and teaching the new undeveloped cadres: showing the unit bureaus how to plan their work, and encouraging the lower organizations to use the greatest initiative in their work. The members elected to the Section Committee are not activated sufficiently. Two or three comrades carry all the responsibility in the Sections.

2. Another shortcoming, flowing directly out of the first, is the extremely weak, and in some cases the lack of political life in the units and sections, which become merely the apparatus in the hands of the higher committees for leaflet distribution, money collection, etc. It is easily understandable, therefore, that many members, not only new ones, but even older comrades, not having any perspective in their work, and not receiving any political education become discouraged and drop out of the Party. Regular discussions in the units, carefully prepared from material supplied by the higher Party Committees will help to strengthen the political life of the unit.

3. The **Daily Worker** should be utilized more as a guide for the work not only by the District Committees, but by the lower organizations. Most of the units examined by

the Commission did not understand fully how the **Daily Worker** could be of help to them in their work.

4. Insufficient effort to recruit new members for the Party. In some cases, recruiting is not carried on because of fear of spies. But in general we do not recruit because there is no systematic, daily hammering at the necessity of getting new members into the Party. At the same time, the Party organizations, especially the units, do not come forward to the masses as the Communist Party, but work among them as representatives of various mass organizations. As a result of this method of work, the workers in a given territory do not know that a Communist Party exists in that territory; they do not know what the Communist Party stands for, and as a result the poison spread by the demagoguery of the bourgeois politicians finds a fertile field.

5. In those units where the membership reads the Party literature and the **Daily Worker**, good work is done, the fluctuation is cut to a minimum, and the general mass work of the unit is more effective than in the other units.

6. In most units there is an insufficient reaction to local political issues.

7. Insufficient work is carried on among the Negro masses; there is general confusion on the Negro question; an insufficient struggle is carried on against white chauvinism, and there is too little systematic work for developing new forces from among the Negro members, as well as from the native-born white workers.

8. Too many unemployed members are dropped for non-payment of dues. The Party organizations must find some method of solving this problem, since a large majority of our membership is unemployed, many of whom either receive no relief, or receive only food, rent checks, etc.

9. There are too many collections in the units. The unemployed members cannot contribute to the various campaigns, and even the employed workers find it very difficult to contribute to the numerous collections. The Party must learn how to develop these campaigns among the masses, thus increasing the effectiveness of the work, and relieving the Party members from the heavy financial burden.

Fluctuation Can Be Stopped — Every District Must Set Up Commission

The work done by the Special Commission is only a beginning. It must be continued by the establishment of special commissions in every district. In most cases, despite the reasons given by the comrades who drop out of the

Party, a close examination will reveal that we lose our members, not because of personal reasons, but because of political and organizational weaknesses in the Party organizations. Such investigations will help us correct our work, and enable us to quickly change the unsatisfactory situation in regard to fluctuation and recruiting.

Directives of the C.C. on the Recruiting Campaign

AT THE Eighth Convention of our Party, with unanimous enthusiasm, it was decided to carry on a recruiting drive to bring our Party to 40,000 members by January 1, 1935. Today, the membership of our Party is just about the same as last January. Not only is the turnover 100 percent, but, most alarming, is that the figures of the last three or four months show a continuous decline in recruiting.

Here we give only one example which shows in the most glaring manner the fundamental reason for the failure to carry out recruiting as a daily task for each individual Party member. At a fraction meeting of one of the unions, at which 266 Party members were present. to the question, "How many of you in the last month have recruited one or more Party members?", only ten comrades raised their hands; which shows that 256 Party members in a union of thousands, were not able in the period of one month to convince a single worker to join the Party. And this is in New York, where we have a strong Left wing, where the Party is comparatively stronger than in the other districts, and where we have the press, etc.

We see that individual Party comrades are not performing one of the elementary Party tasks. Is this because our comrades are unable to convince the workers, or because the workers resist entering our ranks? No! It is because the individual Party members are not orientated towards this fundamental task. The example given above shows that in the recruiting drive which we must launch with all our might, we must solve primarily the question of how to increase the recruiting activity of the Party members. On this basis we will also cut down the fluctuation, inasmuch as the new recruits will be recruits from the shops, from the unions, from the locals where we have oppositions. Thus the new Party members, together with the older ones, will be immediately confronted with the problems of their shops,

their unions, and in this way, enable us more easily to retain them in the ranks of the Party.

Of course, to activate all the Party members we will have to give more attention to the inner situation in the units and fractions, since we cannot call every Party member separately to talk to him as an individual. Therefore, we will succeed in carrying on the recruiting drive, if, simultaneously with the drive, we will carry on a real campaign of enlightenment, of education, and develop correct methods of work in the units and fractions.

What does this situation show? That we did not yet succeed in putting into effect one of the cardinal points of the Open Letter,—namely, the development of personal contact with the masses which can only be done through individual members. The solving of this problem not only will intensify recruiting, but will solve another basic problem of the Party,—the question, namely, of every Party member becoming a leader among the masses: which means, leader in his shop, in his trade union, unemployed council, mass organization, and neighborhood.

Recruiting Drive Begins October 1

In this recruiting drive, which begins on October 1, we must expect that every Party member shall be able to make a list of five workers, minimum, in his trade union, factory, or neighborhood, with whom he will establish personal contact, give literature to, and work with very closely during the coming month as prospects for recruiting. Every Party member will have to have his own package of literature, the best suited for convincing the workers of the correctness of our program, and, also, application cards. All comrades will report about their results in their units, exchange their experiences, develop the best method of how to win the confidence of these workers. In this way, we will not only develop revolutionary competition between districts, sections, and units, but we will develop a real competition between individual Party members. Moreover, in view of the fact that Party members will report the arguments used to convince the workers, and the arguments of the workers, themselves, this will serve to develop the individual Party members.

In the last week in October, or the first week in November, special campaign meetings of the unit shall be arranged at which the Party members will invite their prospective recruits. This meeting should have a specially prepared program to clarify the workers on points on which they are still in doubt, and make an earnest appeal to these workers to join the Party now.

The recruiting drive must also solve another important problem,—the problem of the comradely relationship between Party members. The workers who join our Party must be made to feel at home, and not in a place where everybody gives orders, as a result of which he becomes bewildered, and, sooner or later, leaves the Party because he feels that he is not wanted. For this reason, it is necessary to make clear to the units and to each individual Party member that the comrades who bring in a new member into the Party will be responsible to keep in touch with him personally, for at least two months. Why do we make such a decision? Because, very often, the new Party member is not assigned to the same unit with the Party member who recruited him, and at first feels a little strange. The old Party member who brought him to the Party loses track of him; but if he keeps in touch with him either through the factory, trade union or neighborhood, then he can help him over the first couple of months. The comrade should be made responsible to meet the new Party members he has recruited at least every two weeks, to ask him where he was assigned, to what unit he is attached, what are the problems he is facing, etc.; and if he finds any difficulties, to bring a report to the section, or the district where the Membership Commission of the Org. Dept. will handle such questions immediately.

To carry on an effective recruiting drive, each district should select four or five units for concentration, and place a few of the leading forces in them for the purpose of making of these units an example of how to carry on the campaign. The same procedure should be applied in three or four selected fractions. The experiences of these units and fractions should be popularized in the District Bulletins, should be discussed in all units during the drive, popularized in the **Daily Worker**, and in the **Party Organizer**. Individual Party members and units should be stimulated to write about their experiences, giving answers to the many reasons that prevent the workers from joining the Party. New Party members should be encouraged to make statements as to why they joined the Party.

This recruiting drive must not only lead us to the objective of getting the number of members decided upon by the Eighth Party Convention, but it must stimulate all activities of the Party. It must be utilized to raise the ideological level of the Party so that recruiting will become a conscious everyday task for each individual Party member. While intensifying recruiting, we must intensify at the same time the development of the lower leading cadres, section and unit functionaries, inasmuch as it is because of the

weaknesses of these cadres in improving the life of the units that we are confronted with such a large fluctuation.

To achieve the aims that we have set ourselves in this campaign, we will have to take organizational steps for a thorough mobilization of the Party along the following lines:

The recruiting drive shall be discussed by each District Bureau along the line of these directives, of the statement of the C.C., and the letter to the entire membership, enriched by the experiences of the district, section, and units. The District Bureaus, along the line of these directives, should select the units and fractions of concentration, assign the forces, arrange for special issue of District Bulletins, for the purpose of mobilizing all Party members of the units and fractions.

Functionaries' meetings on a district and section scale shall be called to make the functionaries conscious of the importance of the drive, and clarify them on how the recruiting drive shall be conducted, on the methods to be applied, etc.

These measures must guarantee a thorough discussion in each unit and fraction on the letter and the statement, printed as an editorial in the September 22 issue of the **Daily Worker**, of the C.C. to all the Party members.

In each district and section, the Membership Commission must be either strengthened or built. This is necessary for the purpose of getting new members, making a quick analysis of their applications, and assigning them to the units; for the improvement of attendance and dues-payments; for furnishing the units and individual Party members with the necessary amount of literature, membership cards, etc.

The Seventeenth Anniversary of the October Revolution must become the highest point in the campaign. The tremendous struggles going on as well as the Election Campaign give us the opportunity of reaching large masses; and certainly, with a thorough mobilization of the Party from the top down, along the line of these directives and of the last C.C. resolution, stimulating the initiative from below, we will be able to carry out the decision of the Eighth Party Convention which set the quota of 40,000 members by January 1. On the basis of this quota, each district worked out its own quota some time ago, putting the quota in their control tasks, etc. The problem now is to concretize our previous decisions and stimulate the recruiting drive through the methods of making individual Party members responsible to personally develop contact with the masses along the line of these directives.

Resuming Publication of the Agit-Prop Section

By A. BITTELMAN

BEGINNING with the November issue of the **Party Organizer**, we will resume the publication of the Agit-Prop Section. This will be in the charge of the Agit-Prop Commission of the Central Committee.

It might be well to restate the aims and practical purposes of this Section. Its main purpose is to provide a place for the agit-prop cadres of the Party to exchange experiences in the work of agitation and propaganda. It is expected that in this way we will be able to assist in the building up of competent agit-prop cadres, especially in the Party units and sections.

Such an exchange of experiences at the present time is practically non-existent. Occasionally we find reference to the agitprop work of our Party units and sections in letters to the **Daily Worker**. But this appears very rarely and is not systematically organized.

The latter is not the fault of the **Daily Worker**... The weakness lies primarily with our agit-prop workers, beginning with the units and ending with the Districts. These agit-prop workers rarely write about their experiences. They seldom raise publicly in our press the problems which arise in their work, and what is still a greater rarity, is the description of the successful achievements in agit-prop work and the methods that were applied in obtaining such achievements.

Take, for example, the question of leaflets for mass distribution. The Agit-Prop Commission of the Central Committee receives, as a rule, copies of a number of leaflets published by our Districts, sections, and units. From this we are able to judge the contents and the effectiveness of the agitation. But what is equally important, especially in the case where units and sections issue their own leaflets, is to know how this has been done,—was the leaflet discussed by the unit bureau, the contents of the leaflet, its form? Was it discussed by the unit as a whole? Who wrote the leaflet, a member of the unit or some other comrade? These very essential questions are not reported to us, nor to the press, and it is clear that such information from the units which successfully issue leaflets will be of the greatest value to the Party as a whole.

Or take the question of leaflet distribution. We know that in many instances Party leaflets receive very wide distribution. But it is very seldom that we have in our press a discussion on the **methods** of distribution.

You might discuss further, as an example, the general question of methods of mass agitation. Here we have in mind the various new means and ways devised by some of our units in furthering the agitation among the masses: posters, signs, stamping sidewalks with slogans, etc. We know that in many units of the Party, especially those which are engaged in mass work and in leading mass struggles, there are continually being developed new forms and methods of reaching the masses with our program and slogans. Why don't we have these developments described and discussed in our press so that others can learn from it?

The above is merely brought by way of illustration of the idea that we must begin to exchange systematically the experiences in our agitational and propaganda work. Only in this way can we have a systematic discussion of these experiences, a learning of lessons from them in order to eliminate wrong practices and to spread out the good practices. **The Agit-Prop Section in the Party Organizer** will undertake to serve this purpose.

Will Deal Also with Propaganda

We will, of course, not confine ourselves only to problems of mass agitation. We also wish to deal in this Section with our experiences in propaganda—propaganda among non-Party workers and especially with the question of Party education. On this question, too, we know that in our various Districts and sections there are going on intensive experiences. We want to bring the experiences of these activities into the Agit-Prop Section of the **Party Organizer**. We want to discuss them in the same way in which we propose to discuss the question of mass agitation.

It goes without saying that the shop papers of the Party must and should receive in this Section the greatest attention, but without the help of our units and sections and of the District Agit-Prop Directors, we will not be able to accomplish our purpose. Consequently, we want to impress upon our agit-prop cadres to consider this section of the **Party Organizer** as their forum for presenting problems, experiences, etc.

We also wish to introduce a new feature into this section, namely a department to be known as "Questions and Answers." The purpose of this department will be to print

the questions that our agit-prop workers and Party members generally meet with among the masses, and to supply a brief answer to these questions, sometimes with references to reading material. Our Party members, especially those who meet with non-Party workers and discuss with them our Party program and policies, will be able to testify to the fact that hundreds of questions are being asked of us which our Party members are not always able to answer satisfactorily. Our agit-prop functionaries must make it a practice to get from Party members the questions they are being asked by non-Party workers, to formulate answers to these questions wherever they are able to do so themselves, and to write in to the Agit-Prop Section of the **Party Organizer** all those questions to which they would like us to supply an answer and reference to the material. To satisfy this need will be the main purpose of the department on "Questions and Answers."

We know that we are assuming serious obligations to our Party and to the agit-prop cadres by resuming publication of this section. We hope we can make it of real use and service to our agit-prop cadres, but in this we need their cooperation. We need their systematic reports, articles, and questions. Only on this basis can we make this Section of real service to our Party.
